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This study investigated the pathways of exposure to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
virus among Australian commercial chicken farms and estimated the likelihood of this 
exposure occurring using scenario trees and a stochastic modeling approach following 
the World Organization for Animal Health methodology for risk assessment. Input values 
for the models were sourced from scientific literature and an on-farm survey conducted 
during 2015 and 2016 among Australian commercial chicken farms located in New South 
Wales and Queensland. Outputs from the models revealed that the probability of a first 
LPAI virus exposure to a chicken in an Australian commercial chicken farms from one wild 
bird at any point in time is extremely low. A comparative assessment revealed that across 
the five farm types (non-free-range meat chicken, free-range meat chicken, cage layer, 
barn layer, and free range layer farms), free-range layer farms had the highest probability 
of exposure (7.5 × 10−4; 5% and 95%, 5.7 × 10−4—0.001). The results indicate that the 
presence of a large number of wild birds on farm is required for exposure to occur across 
all farm types. The median probability of direct exposure was highest in free-range farm 
types (5.6 × 10−4 and 1.6 × 10−4 for free-range layer and free-range meat chicken farms, 
respectively) and indirect exposure was highest in non-free-range farm types (2.7 × 10−4, 
2.0 × 10−4, and 1.9 × 10−4 for non-free-range meat chicken, cage layer, and barn layer 
farms, respectively). The probability of exposure was found to be lowest in summer for 
all farm types. Sensitivity analysis revealed that the proportion of waterfowl among wild 
birds on the farm, the presence of waterfowl in the range and feed storage areas, and the 
prevalence of LPAI in wild birds are the most influential parameters for the probability of 
Australian commercial chicken farms being exposed to avian influenza (AI) virus. These 
results highlight the importance of ensuring good biosecurity on farms to minimize the risk 
of exposure to AI virus and the importance of continuous surveillance of LPAI prevalence 
including subtypes in wild bird populations.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses are naturally 
circulating in wild birds globally. Birds in the taxonomic orders 
Anseriformes (waterfowl including ducks and geese) and 
Charadriiformes (shorebirds including gulls, waders, and auks) 
constitute the major natural reservoir of LPAI with an approxi-
mate prevalence of 2.5 and 0.6%, respectively, in Australia (1). 
Domestic gallinaceous (e.g., chickens and turkeys) poultry can 
become infected with LPAI via the fecal–oral route whereby 
poultry consume infectious fecal material from wild birds; either 
consuming feces directly or indirectly, such as through contami-
nated water, aerosol, or fomites. Once poultry are infected with 
LPAI, the virus may then mutate to highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI). During HPAI infection, morbidity and mortal-
ity rates in gallinaceous poultry are very high (50–89%) and can 
reach 100% in some flocks (2).
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) is classed as a category 
2 emergency animal disease in Australia under the Emergency 
Animal Disease Response Agreement as it has the potential to 
cause severe production losses and impact the national economy, 
and potentially impact human health and/or the environment 
(3). Australia has experienced seven HPAI outbreaks in poultry 
farms since 1976. All outbreaks were eradicated using a “stamp-
ing out” strategy which involved quarantine and culling of all 
poultry on infected premises, tracing and surveillance of farms 
at risk and restriction of movement to reduce spread of the virus 
(4–6). To date HPAI virus has not been detected in wild birds in 
Australia (1).
There is concern from experts within the Australian poultry 
industry about the change in probability of AI outbreak occur-
rence with the recent consumer driven expansion of free-range 
poultry farms. There are approximately 800 commercial contract 
meat chicken grower farms and 300 commercial chicken egg farms 
currently in Australia (7, 8). Products from commercial chicken 
farms account for the large majority of the national market; where 
the top seven meat chicken companies and the top 50 chicken egg 
producers supply over 95 and 80% of the national chicken meat 
and eggs consumed in Australia (7–9). Non-commercial chicken 
farms are small-scale farms that are suspected or proven to have 
less adoption of biosecurity practices than commercial farms. 
However, there is limited contact between non-commercial and 
commercial chicken farms and so the risk of exposure to disease 
on non-commercial farms may be higher but they do not appear 
to be a threat to the Australian chicken industry. The cost of a 
disease outbreak in non-commercial farms would also be less than 
commercial farms due fewer birds to destroy and a small overall 
impact on the industry, market and consumers (10). New South 
Wales (NSW) is the leading state for both egg and chicken meat 
production; producing 32 and 34% of the national egg and chicken 
meat volumes, respectively. Queensland and Victoria follow, pro-
ducing 28 and 27% of the national egg volume, respectively, and 19 
and 24% of the national chicken meat volume, respectively (7–9). 
The highest concentrations of egg farms in the country are in the 
Greater Sydney (31%) and Hunter regions (20%) (9). Free-range 
chicken meat production in Australia was regarded as a “cottage 
industry” in 2006 and now accounts for at least 15% of the total 
market (7). Similarly, the retail market share of free-range eggs 
has increased from 10% in 2000 to 50% in 2017 (8). The concern 
is that the expansion of free-range poultry farms will increase the 
opportunities of contact between wild birds and domestic poultry 
in Australia, thus potentially increasing the probability of LPAI 
exposure in Australian commercial chicken farms.
There are substantial differences in farm design, management, 
and biosecurity practices among the Australian commercial 
chicken enterprises, i.e., cage, barn, and free-range systems of both 
layer and meat chicken farms which can influence wild bird pres-
ence on farm (11, 12). In addition, previous work has identified 
differences in the type of wild birds present on farms of different 
production types and biosecurity implementation (13). There is 
a need to quantify and compare the probability of LPAI exposure 
for all types of Australian commercial chicken enterprises consid-
ering these differences. In addition, there is a need to investigate 
the effect of on-farm preventive actions that can mitigate the 
risk and impact of future AI outbreak occurrences in Australia. 
The aim of this study was to consider the potential pathways for 
LPAI exposure from wild birds to chickens present on all types 
of commercial chicken enterprises in Australia (non-free-range 
meat, free-range meat, cage layer, barn layer, free-range layer), 
and then to conduct a comparative assessment of how likely LPAI 
exposure from wild birds to chickens would occur via each of the 
considered pathways and overall for each farm type. The most 
influential pathways of exposure are also identified, thereby lead-
ing to recommendations about on-farm biosecurity practices that 
could be implemented to minimize these risks.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
risk assessment Model
The World Organisation of Animal Health provides a meth-
odological framework for conducting animal health risk analysis 
(14). Risk assessment is a component of the overall risk analysis 
methods, which involves an entry, exposure and consequence 
assessment, and an estimation of the risk. The current study uses 
an exposure assessment to investigate the potential exposure to 
AI viruses of domestic chickens raised in commercial chicken 
properties in Australia. A partial consequence assessment was 
also conducted and is presented in a subsequent paper (15). The 
exposure assessment considers all the potential pathways by 
which chickens located in a commercial layer or meat chicken 
farm can be exposed to AI virus from wild birds and the prob-
ability of these pathways occurring is calculated. Such pathways 
were portrayed using scenario trees (16) and developed using 
Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 7, 2010). The probabilities were 
estimated using Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modeling 
using the program @RISK 7.0 (Palisade Corporation, USA) 
implemented in Microsoft Excel. Each simulation consisted of 
50,000 iterations sampled using the Latin hypercube method with 
a fixed random seed of one.
Data sources
Most of the input values used in this model were parameter-
ized using data collected from a survey on commercial chicken 
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farms in Australia (11, 12). The survey defined commercial layer 
farms as those with more than 1,000 birds and commercial meat 
chicken farms as those with more than 25,000 birds. It involved 
a comprehensive on-farm interview with farmers, including 
questions related to farm management, biosecurity practices, and 
wild bird presence. Scientific literature was used to estimate input 
parameters when required.
survey on commercial layer and Meat 
chicken Farms in the sydney Basin 
region and south east Queensland
A survey commenced in mid-2015 involving on-farm inter-
views with the farm manager or farm owner on 73 commercial 
chicken farms; 15 non-free-range meat, 15 free-range meat, nine 
cage layer, 9 barn layer, and 25 free-range layer farms. The farms 
were located in the Sydney basin region in NSW and in South 
East Queensland. The Sydney basin region was selected due to 
the high concentration of both layer and meat chicken farms 
in this area. However in this region, free-range meat chicken 
farms are all owned by one of two large privately owned meat 
chicken companies in Australia. Therefore, additional farm 
visits to South East Queensland were conducted to gain more 
representative data of privately owned meat chicken compa-
nies in Australia. The interviews involved a comprehensive 
questionnaire which asked questions to the farmers relating to 
biosecurity practices performed on farm, wild bird and animal 
presence, general farm information, and farm management. A 
greater proportion of layer farms and of free-range farms were 
surveyed due to the greater perceived risk of AI occurrence on 
these farm types. More details on the methodology of the survey, 
including the region and farm selection, questionnaire develop-
ment, and conduct of the on-farm interviews, can be found in 
Scott et al. (11).
statistical analysis
The statistical program JMP® was used (© 2012 SAS Institute 
Inc., Cary, NC, USA) to conduct one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to analyze differences between the outcome probabili-
ties for each of the different farm types. The outcome probabilities 
compared using ANOVA were the outcome probability from 
1,000 iterations of the exposure scenario tree model simulation 
for each farm type, with each iteration reflecting the situation 
for one farm at a point in time. A p-value of <0.05 was used to 
determine statistical significance in these analyses.
Probability of exposure
The exposure assessment examines all potential pathways by 
which AI virus can be introduced from wild birds into a com-
mercial layer or meat chicken farm and estimates the probability 
that a first exposure to a chicken occurs through each of these 
pathways. Five exposure assessments were performed, one for 
each farm type: non-free-range meat chicken farms, free-range 
meat chicken farms, cage layer farms, barn layer farms, and free-
range layer farms. Only LPAI viruses were considered due to the 
fact that HPAI viruses have never been detected from Australian 
wild birds during surveillance activities (1).
In addition, the models considered differences depending on 
the season or time of the year, given virus prevalence in wild birds 
changes during different times of the year. The probability of chick-
ens accessing outdoors in free-range farms also changes during 
different times of the year due to weather conditions. Therefore, 
three “seasons” were considered in the exposure assessments; 
winter (June–August), summer (December–February), and then 
autumn and spring (March–May and September–November) 
were combined as one season.
Parameters required in these exposure assessments included 
(1) the probability of wild bird presence in different areas of the 
commercial chicken farm; (2) the probability of wild birds being 
infected and excreting LPAI viruses; and (3) parameters in relation 
to the management and biosecurity practices performed on the 
farm that would increase or reduce the probability of exposure. 
The main pathways of exposure considered in these assessments 
were the following six pathways: (1) direct exposure in a shed; (2) 
direct exposure around feed storage areas; (3) indirect exposure 
through fomites or vectors; (4) indirect exposure through aerosol; 
(5) indirect exposure through contaminated water inside; (6) 
indirect exposure through contaminated water outside sheds; and 
(7) direct exposure on the range.
For the purpose of this model, direct exposure is defined as 
physical contact between a wild bird and a commercial chicken or 
direct contact between a commercial chicken and wild bird feces. 
By contrast, indirect exposure is defined as a commercial chicken 
coming into contact with the virus through a medium, i.e., through 
water, fomites, or vectors. Fomites include boots and equipment 
contaminated with wild bird feces and are subsequently in contact 
with chickens through movement. Biological vectors may become 
infected with the virus, most notably insects, mice, and rats, and 
may shed the virus in the presence of chickens or be consumed 
by chickens. Mechanical vectors, such as dogs and cats, can also 
present the virus to chickens through movement only.
The overall probability of exposure represents the probabil-
ity of a first exposure to a domestic chicken by one wild bird in 
each farm type, irrespective of the pathway of exposure. This 
probability was calculated by summing the outcome probability 
of all the pathways that lead to exposure for each farm type. In 
addition, the overall probability of direct and indirect exposure 
was calculated by summing the outcome probabilities of the 
direct (pathways 1, 2, and 7) and indirect (pathways 3, 4, 5, 
and 6) pathways, respectively, which lead to exposure for each 
farm type.
The models estimate the probability of exposure posed by a 
single wild bird at any point in time. This outcome probability 
of exposure is then used to estimate the expected number of 
exposures considering a range of the number of wild birds that 
could visit a property at any point in time and using binomial 
distributions. The standard prevalence of LPAI, at approximately 
2.5, 0.6, and 0.5% for waterfowl, shorebirds, and other bird types, 
respectively, of which a subset are H5 and H7 subtypes, was used 
for these binomial distributions (1). The prevalence of LPAI in 
waterfowl and the proportion of waterfowl on the farm was then 
also changed in the model to assess the expected number of 
exposures in potential worst-case scenarios: (1) 100% waterfowl 
proportion and no change in waterfowl LPAI prevalence; (2) 
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80% waterfowl proportion and 20% waterfowl LPAI prevalence; 
(3) 100% waterfowl proportion and 10% waterfowl LPAI preva-
lence; (4) 50% waterfowl proportion and 20% waterfowl LPAI 
prevalence; and (5) 50% waterfowl proportion and 10% waterfowl 
LPAI prevalence. The distributions assume that all wild birds are 
independent, have the same probability of being infected, and 
those infected are always infective.
Tables  1–5 provide a description of the nodes and input 
parameters of the scenario trees used for the exposure assess-
ments for non-free-range meat chicken farms, free-range meat 
chicken farms, cage layer farms, barn layer farms, and free-range 
layer farms, respectively. Cage and barn layer farms are referred 
to as non-free-range layer farms and have the same scenario tree 
structure. Similarly, free-range layer and free-range meat chicken 
farms also have the same scenario tree structure. Therefore, the 
scenario trees used for non-free-range layer farms, non-free-
range meat chicken farms, and free-range layer and meat chicken 
farms are depicted in Figures 1–3, respectively. Nodes and input 
parameters related to the range areas are specific for free-range 
farm types, and the nodes for pathways in which surface water is 
used are specific for layer farm types and free-range meat chicken 
farms. The pathway (6) indirect exposure through contaminated 
water outside sheds does not exist for non-free-range meat 
chicken farms, and pathway (7) direct exposure on the range 
does not exist for non-free-range meat chicken and layer farms. 
Detailed and further descriptions of the nodes are provided in the 
supplementary information.
sensitivity analysis
The Advanced Sensitivity Analysis tool of the program @RISK 7.0 
(Palisade Corporation, USA) was used to determine the impact of 
changes in the input parameters on the model outputs.
The effect of the following inputs on exposure were investi-
gated: (1) proportion of waterfowl on property (Prop_WF); (2) 
proportion of waterfowl on waterbodies (WB_WF); (3) propor-
tion of waterfowl in feed storage areas (F_WF); (4) proportion of 
waterfowl on the range (R_WF); (5) Farm use of surface water 
(Surface_Water_Used); (6) water inside the chicken shed is treated 
(Water_Inside_Treated); (7) water outside the chicken shed is 
treated (Water_Outside_Treated); (8) escapee chickens from the 
shed or range (Escape); and (9) indirect exposure to the virus 
(Indirect). The influence of the prevalence of LPAI (Prev_WF) in 
waterfowl was also investigated separately.
The values for the input parameters included in the sensitivity 
analysis were varied from 0 to 1 in thirds (0, 0.3, 0.6, 1), with 1,000 
iterations used for each of the values included, while all other 
input values were fixed to their base value. The model outputs 
assessed were the overall probability of exposure to LPAI across 
the three seasons per farm type.
resUlTs
Probability of Direct and indirect exposure
The probability of a first LPAI exposure to a chicken on a com-
mercial chicken farm being exposed from a wild bird present 
on the farm at any point in time through the pathways consid-
ered in this assessment was estimated to be extremely low for 
all farm types (Table 6). The assessment estimates a median 
(5–95%) overall probability of LPAI exposure on commercial 
free-range layer farms to be 7.5 × 10−4 (5.7 × 10−4–1.0 × 10−4); 
this being the highest probability among all farm types. 
The farm type with the lowest estimated overall probability 
of LPAI exposure was the barn layer farm type (3.0 ×  10−4; 
1.4 × 10−4–5.8 × 10−4).
When the type of LPAI exposure was considered, direct 
exposure had the highest probability of causing first exposure to 
a domestic chicken among free-range farm types, with the lowest 
being reported for barn layer farms (Table 6). By contrast, the 
probability of indirect exposure was highest in non-free-range 
farm types.
To assess the influence of flock size of the farm on the prob-
ability of exposure, the overall probability of exposure of each 
farm type was multiplied by hypothetical numbers of sheds on 
the property, as each shed can be considered independent in the 
exposure models. Five and 10 sheds were used, and results are 
shown in Table 6.
estimated number of exposures 
according to Volume of Wild Birds
Results from the binomial distributions are shown in Table  7 
and Figure  4. According to the model, a considerable number 
of wild birds are required for exposure to occur across all farm 
types. The output distributions indicate that for all farm types, 
except free-range layer farms, when 1,000 wild birds are present 
at any point in time around the farm, only on 5 of 100 farms 
(or scenarios) would one exposure occur, indicating that in 94.9% 
of farms, exposure would not occur. For free-range layer farms, 
only 100 wild birds are required to be present to expect a similar 
exposure output. In instances where 1,000 birds visit at any point 
in time on free-range layer farms, on 50 out of 100 farms (or 
scenarios), one LPAI exposure would occur based on the median 
of one in Table 7.
The number of exposures was assessed by changing the propor-
tion of wild birds that are waterfowl and the LPAI prevalence of 
waterfowl, with some scenarios representing worst-case scenarios 
(with high proportion of waterfowl present among the wild birds 
on farm and with elevated LPAI prevalence among the wild birds 
on farm). Waterfowl may make up a considerable proportion of 
wild birds on the property during specific events such as drought 
and, similarly, the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl may increase 
with population dynamics, such as an increase in immune-naive 
juvenile birds. The impact of these scenarios on the number of 
expected exposures is shown in Table 7. The largest number of 
exposures is seen when the proportion of waterfowl is increased 
to 80% and the prevalence increased to 20%. For all farm types, 
other than free-range layer farms, at least one exposure would 
occur when 50 wild birds are present at the property, and this 
would occur on 5 out of 100 farms (or scenarios). Only 10 wild 
birds are required for an exposure to occur in these circumstances 
for free-range layer farms.
TaBle 1 | Nodes, parameter estimates, and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial chickens on non-free-range meat chicken farms in Australia 
(specifically in the Sydney basin region and South East Queensland) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) from wild birds.
node Branch of node Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property
Waterfowl
Shorebirds
Other
Proportion of answers from farmers that reported the 
respective wild bird type on their property (Prop_WF; 
Prop_SH; Prop_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
48 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 16 answers of waterfowl; 7 
answers of shorebirds; and 25 answers of other wild birds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds
Yes
No
Probability of the different wild bird types; waterfowl, 
shorebirds, or other, being infected with LPAI of H5 
or H7 subtype in winter, summer, and autumn/spring 
(Prev_WF_Winter; Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; Prev_SH_AuSp; 
Prev_O_Winter; Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1) multiplied by the proportion of H5 and H7 of total 
positive influenza A samples in New South Wales (NSW) for the seasons 
winter, summer, and autumn/spring
Information on the values for waterfowl and shorebirds that informed the 
Beta distributions for the three seasons and the proportion of influenza A 
samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes can be obtained by contacting the 
corresponding author
1,552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other bird type sample (s); this 
Beta distribution used for all three seasons
Grillo et al. (1)
Hansbro et al. (17)
NSW NAIWB Surveillance 
unpublished data (2016)
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that witnessed the respective wild 
bird type inside chicken sheds on the farm. The data 
suggest the probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and, therefore, a Pert 
distribution is used for these wild bird types (Sheds_WF; 
Sheds_SH; Sheds_O)
Sheds_WF = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_SH = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_O = Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 non-free-range meat chicken farms surveyed; 7 reported seeing other wild 
bird types in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm
Waterbodies
Feed storage
Proportion of answers from farmers that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type in the respective areas (WB_WF, 
F_WF; WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
16 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 13 answers of waterfowl in 
waterbodies; and 3 answers of waterfowl in feed storage areas
7 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 6 answers of shorebirds in 
waterbodies; and 1 answer of shorebirds in feed storage areas
18 answers of other wild bird types in other locations (n); 9 answers of other 
bird types in waterbodies; and 9 answers of other bird types in feed storage 
areas
Scott et al. (11, 13)
5. Aerial transmission 
of LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens
Yes
No
Probability of LPAI introduction via aerial dispersion 
from wild birds on waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
12 air samples tested at less than 100 m from 83 LPAI (H5N2)-infected swans 
(n), 0 positive air samples obtained
Jonges et al. (18)
6. Surface water is 
used for chickens
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that use surface water for the chicken 
farm (Surface_Water_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 farms surveyed (n), 1 farm used surface water for farm
Scott et al. (11, 13)
7. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water inside 
the chicken sheds (Water_Inside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
32 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 28 answers of water treated 
inside chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
8. Chickens have 
escaped the shed
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that have reported chickens 
unintentionally outside of the shed (Escape)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 farms surveyed (n), 0 farms reported chickens escaped shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
9. Other indirect 
routes that can 
lead to LPAI 
introduction
Yes
No
Probability that chickens will be exposed to LPAI virus via 
other indirect methods; boots, mice/rats, insects, and 
pets combined into one probability (Indirect) (Probability 
of exposure from boots + mice/rats + insects + pets)
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots)
1/25 answers did not use footbaths
avian influenza (AI) virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, considered high 
probability of exposure
PrBoots = (1/25) × [Uniform (0.7, 1)]
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice)
10/25 answers had mice/rats in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
Achenbach and Bowen (19)
Nielsen et al. (20)
Tiwari et al. (21)
Nazir et al. (22)
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exposure assessment in the Three 
seasons
The estimated probabilities of a chicken on commercial chicken 
farms being exposed to LPAI virus from wild birds at any point in 
time during the three seasons previously defined (winter, autumn/
spring, and summer) are summarized in Table  8. The results 
show that the overall probability of exposure differs between the 
different seasons and the season influence also differs between 
farm types. While the median overall probability of exposure to 
LPAI virus is highest in winter for free-range layer farms, this 
probability is highest in autumn/spring for non-free-range meat 
chicken, cage layer, and barn layer farm types. No difference 
between winter and autumn/spring was observed for free-range 
meat chicken farms. For all farm types, the lowest median overall 
probability of LPAI virus exposure is in summer.
exposure sensitivity analysis
According to the exposure sensitivity analysis, the most influ-
ential parameters were the proportion of waterfowl among wild 
birds on the property and the probability of waterfowl being 
on the feed storage areas (Figure  5). When the proportion of 
waterfowl among wild birds on the property becomes 100% (base 
value between 0.28 and 0.34 for all farm types), which can occur 
during circumstances such as drought, there is an approximate 
2.8-fold increase in the probability of LPAI exposure for all farm 
types. A similar increase in the probability of LPAI exposure is 
obtained when the probability of waterfowl being on feed storage 
areas is increased to 100%. On free-range farms (Figures 5A,B), 
waterfowl on the range was the third most influential parameter. 
When the probability of waterfowl on the range is increased to 
100% (base value 0.50 and 0.28 for free-range meat chicken and 
layer farms, respectively), an approximate 1.7-fold increase in the 
probability of LPAI exposure occurs. On barn layer farm types, 
the treatment of water inside the shed is also an important influ-
ential parameter. If the probability of water inside sheds being 
appropriately treated is decreased to 0% (base value 0.92 for barn 
layer farms), there is an approximate 2.4-fold increase in the prob-
ability of LPAI exposure. For other farm types, the impact of water 
treatment is not as significant. Escapee chickens from the sheds 
or the range was another influential parameter; if the probability 
of this occurring is increased to 100% (base value 0.042, 0.042, 
0.45, 0.067, and 0.46 for non-free-range meat chicken, free-range 
meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer and free-range layer farms, 
respectively), an approximate 1.7-fold increase in the probability 
of LPAI exposure occurs for all farm types. The other indirect 
routes parameter (includes boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats, or 
dogs) was slightly less influential, with an approximate 1.5-fold 
increase in the probability of LPAI exposure if the probability 
of these pathways occurring increases to 100% (base value of 
0.28–0.43 for all farm types). The proportion of waterfowl on 
waterbodies, the use of surface water, and the treatment of water 
outside of sheds were found to be the least influential parameters 
in the exposure probability for all farm types.
Sensitivity analysis on the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl 
was also conducted separately as this parameter has a profound 
influence on the probability of LPAI exposure. It was found Ta
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TaBle 2 | Nodes, parameter estimates, and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial chickens on free-range meat chicken farms in Australia (specifically in 
the Sydney basin region and South East Queensland) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) from wild birds.
node Branch of 
node
Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1. Type of wild bird 
on farm property
Waterfowl
Shorebirds
Other
Proportion of answers from farmers that reported the 
respective wild bird type on their property (Prop_WF; 
Prop_SH; Prop_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
36 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 12 answers of waterfowl; 2 answers of 
shorebirds; and 22 answers of other wild birds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
2. Prevalence of LPAI 
in wild birds
Yes
No
Probability of the different wild bird types; waterfowl, 
shorebirds, or other, being infected with LPAI of H5 
or H7 subtype in winter, summer, and autumn/spring 
(Prev_WF_Winter; Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; Prev_SH_AuSp; 
Prev_O_Winter; Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1) multiplied by the proportion of H5 and H7 of total positive 
influenza A samples in New South Wales (NSW) for the seasons winter, summer, and 
autumn/spring
Information on the values for waterfowl and shorebirds that informed the Beta 
distributions for the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A samples that are H5 
and H7 subtypes can be obtained by contacting the corresponding author
1,552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other bird type sample (s); this Beta 
distribution used for all three seasons
Grillo et al. (1)
Hansbro et al. (17)
NSW NAIWB Surveillance 
unpublished data (2016)
3. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported inside 
chicken sheds
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that witnessed the respective wild 
bird type inside chicken sheds on the farm. The data 
suggest the probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and, therefore, a Pert 
distribution is used for these wild bird types (Sheds_WF; 
Sheds_SH; Sheds_O)
Sheds_WF = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_SH = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_O = Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 farms surveyed; 11 reported seeing other wild bird types in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
4. Respective wild 
bird type has been 
reported in other 
locations on the 
farm
Waterbodies
Feed storage
Proportion of answers from farmers that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type in the respective areas (WB_WF, 
F_WF; WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
20 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 14 answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 
2 answers of waterfowl in feed storage areas; and 4 answers of waterfowl on the 
range
4 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 
0 answer of shorebirds in feed storage areas, and 2 answers of shorebirds on the 
range
37 answers of other wild bird types in other locations (n); 10 answers of other bird 
types in waterbodies; 12 answers of other bird types in feed storage areas; and 15 
answers of other bird types on the range
Scott et al. (11, 13)
5. Suitable weather 
conditions for 
range access
Yes
No
Probability that the weather conditions for seasons 
winter, summer, and autumn/spring are suitable for 
farmers to allow chickens on the range; when conditions 
are dry, between 17 and 28 C and there is no severe 
weather (Range_Winter, Range_Summer, Range_AuSp)
(Probability of suitable temperature + dry conditions + no 
severe weather)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Winter: 13,248 winter hours recorded (n), 1,555 winter hours >17°C; 1,755 winter 
hours where precipitation >1 mm; 114 severe weather events in NSW, 1 severe 
weather events in Sydney basin in winter
Summer: 13,248 summer hours recorded (n), 6,231.5 summer hours <28°C; 
8,098.5 summer hours where precipitation >1 mm; 114 severe weather events in 
NSW, 64 severe weather events in Sydney basin in summer
Autumn/Spring: 26,352 autumn/spring hours recorded (n), 9,338.5 autumn/spring 
hours >17 C and <28 C; 3,960.5 autumn/spring hours where precipitation >1 mm; 
114 severe weather events in NSW, 49 severe weather events in Sydney basin in 
autumn/spring
Bureau of Meterology (23)
6. Birds are a suitable 
age for range 
access
Yes
No
Proportion of the chicken’s lifetime in which they are 
allowed onto the range (Age)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Average age at flock depopulation 43.25 days (n), age allowed outside 21 days
Scott et al. (11, 13)
7. Birds actually go 
onto the range
Yes
No
Proportion of flock that actually leave shed and use the 
range as reported by farmers (Use_Range)
Average of 15 Beta functions (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Total flock proportion 100 (n); proportion of flock that use range (9 varying answers)
Scott et al. (11, 13)
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node Branch of 
node
Parameter estimates input values Data sources
8. Aerial 
transmission of 
LPAI from wild 
birds to domestic 
chickens
Yes
No
Probability of LPAI introduction via aerial dispersion 
from wild birds on waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
12 samples tested at less than 100 m from 83 LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 
positive air samples obtained
Jonges et al. (18)
9. Surface water is 
used for chickens
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that use surface 
water for the chicken farm (Surface_Water_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 farms surveyed (n), 2 answers used surface water for farm
Scott et al. (11, 13)
10. Locations surface 
water is used for
Inside shed
Outside shed
Proportion of answers from farmers that use surface 
water for inside the shed versus outside the shed  
(Water_Inside_Used, Water_Outside_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
6 answers of surface water use (n), 4 answers use surface water inside shed, and 2 
answers use surface water outside shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
11. Water inside 
chicken sheds is 
treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water 
inside the chicken sheds (Water_Inside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
34 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 34 answers of water treated inside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
12. Water outside 
chicken sheds is 
treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water used 
outside the shed (Water_Outside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 8 answers of water treated outside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
13. Chickens have 
escaped the shed 
or range area
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that have reported chickens 
unintentionally outside of the shed or range area (Escape)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
15 farms surveyed (n), 0 farms reported chickens escaped shed or range area
Scott et al. (11, 13)
14. Other indirect 
routes that can 
lead to LPAI 
introduction
Yes
No
Probability that chickens will be exposed to LPAI virus 
via other indirect methods; boots, mice/rats, insects and 
pets combined into one probability (Indirect) (Probability 
of exposure from boots + mice/rats + insects + pets)
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots)
1/28 answers did not use footbaths
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, considered high probability of exposure
PrBoots = (1/28) × [Uniform (0.7, 1)]
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice)
12/28 answers had mice/rats in sheds
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus isolation
PrMice = (10/25) × [Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)]
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects)
13/28 answers had insects in sheds
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus isolation
PrInsects = (13/28) × [Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)]
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets)
2/28 answers allowed pets in sheds on range area
AI virus survival on feces is 2/6 days, considered moderate probability of exposure
PrBoots = (2/28) × [Uniform (0.3, 0.5)]
Scott et al. (11, 13)
Henzler et al. (24)
Achenbach and  
Bowen (19)
Nielsen et al. (20)
Tiwari et al. (21)
Nazir et al. (22)
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TaBle 2 | Continued
TaBle 3 | Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial chickens on cage layer farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney 
basin region and South East Queensland) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) from wild birds.
node Branch of 
node
Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1. Type of wild bird on farm 
property
Waterfowl
Shorebirds
Other
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
reported the respective wild bird type on their 
property (Prop_WF; Prop_SH; Prop_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
30 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 9 answers of waterfowl; 2 answers of 
shorebirds; and 19 answers of other wild birds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
2. Prevalence of LPAI in wild 
birds
Yes
No
Probability of the different wild bird types; 
waterfowl, shorebirds or other, being infected 
with LPAI of H5 or H7 subtype in winter, summer 
and autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; Prev_WF_
Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; Prev_SH_Winter; 
Prev_SH_Summer; Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_
Winter; Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1) multiplied by the proportion of H5 and H7 of total positive influenza A 
samples in New South Wales (NSW) for the seasons winter, summer, and autumn/spring
Information on the values for waterfowl and shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions 
for the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes 
can be obtained by contacting the corresponding author
1,552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other bird type sample (s); this Beta 
distribution used for all three seasons
Grillo et al. (1)
Hansbro et al. (17)
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data 
(2016)
3. Respective wild bird type 
has been reported inside 
chicken sheds
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type inside chicken sheds 
on the farm. The data suggests the probability 
for waterfowl and shorebirds inside sheds is 
close to 0 and, therefore, a Pert distribution 
is used for these wild bird types (Sheds_WF; 
Sheds_SH; Sheds_O)
Sheds_WF = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_SH = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_O = Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 farms surveyed; 5 reported seeing other wild bird types in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
4. Respective wild bird type 
has been reported in other 
locations on the farm
Waterbodies
Feed storage
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
witnessed the respective wild bird type in the 
respective areas (WB_WF, F_WF; WB_SH, 
F_SH; WB_O, F_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 9 answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; and 0 
answers of waterfowl in feed storage areas
2 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; and 
0 answer of shorebirds in feed storage areas
14 answers of other wild bird types in other locations (n); 6 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; and 8 answers of other bird types in feed storage areas
Scott et al. (11, 13)
5. Aerial transmission of 
LPAI from wild birds to 
domestic chickens
Yes
No
Probability of LPAI introduction via aerial 
dispersion from wild birds on waterbodies to 
chickens on farm (Aerosol_WB)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
12 samples tested at less than 100 m from 83 LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive air 
samples obtained
Jonges et al. (18)
6. Surface water is used for 
chickens
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that use surface water for 
the chicken farm (Surface_Water_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 farms surveyed (n), 2 farm used surface water for farm
Scott et al. (11, 13)
7. Locations surface water is 
used for
Inside shed
Outside shed
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for inside the shed versus 
outside the shed (Water_Inside_Used, 
Water_Outside_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
3 answers of surface water use (n), 1 answers use surface water inside shed, and 2 
answers use surface water outside shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
8. Water inside chicken 
sheds is treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
treat water inside the chicken sheds 
(Water_Inside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
18 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 17 answers of water treated inside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
9. Water outside chicken 
sheds is treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers 
that treat water used outside the shed 
(Water_Outside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
5 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 2 answers of water treated outside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
10. Chickens have escaped 
the shed
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that have reported chickens 
unintentionally outside of the shed (Escape)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 farms surveyed (n), 1 farms reported chickens escaped shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
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from the sensitivity analysis there is an approximate threefold 
to fourfold increase in the probability of LPAI exposure across 
the farm types when the LPAI prevalence in wild waterfowl is 
increased to 20%.
DiscUssiOn
This study comparatively estimates the probability of a first 
exposure of a chicken to LPAI viruses from wild birds present on 
different types of commercial chicken enterprises in Australia. 
The probabilities estimated in this study can be considered 
representative for the Sydney basin region as weather informa-
tion and the majority of on-farm surveys conducted are specific 
to this region. In addition, all of the LPAI wild bird prevalence 
data used in this study was from the Sydney basin region, where 
most samples were collected from the Lower Hunter region 
which was considered part of the Sydney basin region in the 
survey by Scott et  al. (11). Generalizing these probabilities to 
commercial chicken farms in other regions of Australia, non-
commercial chicken farms or farms with poultry species other 
than chickens must be done with caution as differences in farm 
design and management and biosecurity practices exist as well as 
differences in weather conditions and LPAI wild bird prevalence 
in different regions (1, 23, 25). Further research is required to 
confidently quantify the risk of exposure to commercial chicken 
farms in other regions, to non-commercial chicken farms and 
other poultry farms.
Probability of lPai exposure
The probabilities of exposure estimated in this study apply to 
commercial chicken farms according to the definition imple-
mented in the on-farm survey conducted by Scott et al. (11) as 
this survey provided data that informed most input parameters. 
This survey included layer and meat chicken farm which house 
more than 1,000 or 25,000 chickens, respectively. Thus, the model 
outputs in this study apply to these flock sizes. There is epide-
miological evidence that large flock sizes may be at greater risk 
of HPAI introduction compared to small flock sizes (26). There 
is limited information to suggest that this is also true for LPAI 
introduction, but it is logical to acknowledge that large flock sizes 
have more animal contacts which may increase the risk of LPAI 
exposure. This study assessed the influence of flock size on the 
overall probability by considering the number of sheds on the 
property and demonstrated that more sheds on a property lead 
to greater probabilities of exposure.
Overall, the probability of a first exposure to LPAI from wild 
birds at any point in time is extremely low for all farm types; how-
ever, the highest probability of exposure is seen among free-range 
layer farms, with this probability being over two times higher 
than for the other farm types. These results are in agreement with 
a study conducted by Gonzales et al. (27), which reported a rate of 
introduction of LPAI virus 13 times higher in outdoor layer farms 
when compared to indoor layer farms in the Netherlands. It has 
been indicated that the most efficient means of introduction of AI 
into commercial poultry is through direct contact with infected 
birds (28). Free-range farms have access to the outdoors where 
direct exposure to wild birds is more likely to occur compared to Ta
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TaBle 4 | Nodes, parameter estimates, and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial chickens on barn layer farms in Australia (specifically in the Sydney 
basin region and South East Queensland) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) from wild birds.
node Branch of node Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1. Type of wild 
bird on farm 
property
Waterfowl
Shorebirds
Other
Proportion of answers from farmers that reported the 
respective wild bird type on their property (Prop_WF; 
Prop_SH; Prop_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
26 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 7 answers of waterfowl; 2 answers of 
shorebirds; and 17 answers of other wild birds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
2. Prevalence of 
LPAI in wild 
birds
Yes
No
Probability of the different wild bird types; waterfowl, 
shorebirds or other, being infected with LPAI of H5 
or H7 subtype in winter, summer, and autumn/spring 
(Prev_WF_Winter; Prev_WF_Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; 
Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_SH_Summer; Prev_SH_AuSp; 
Prev_O_Winter; Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1) multiplied by the proportion of H5 and H7 of total positive influenza 
A samples in New South Wales (NSW) for the seasons winter, summer, and autumn/spring
Information on the values for waterfowl and shorebirds that informed the Beta distributions 
for the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A samples that are H5 and H7 subtypes 
can be obtained by contacting the corresponding author
1,552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other bird type sample (s); this Beta 
distribution used for all three seasons
Grillo et al. (1)
Hansbro et al. (17)
NSW NAIWB 
Surveillance 
unpublished data (2016)
3. Respective 
wild bird type 
has been 
reported 
inside chicken 
sheds
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that witnessed the respective wild 
bird type inside chicken sheds on the farm. The data 
suggests the probability for waterfowl and shorebirds 
inside sheds is close to 0 and, therefore, a Pert 
distribution is used for these wild bird types (Sheds_WF; 
Sheds_SH; Sheds_O)
Sheds_WF = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_SH = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_O = Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 barn layer farms surveyed; 5 reported seeing other wild bird types in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
4. Respective 
wild bird type 
has been 
reported 
in other 
locations on 
the farm
Waterbodies
Feed storage
Proportion of answers from farmers that witnessed the 
respective wild bird type in the respective areas (WB_WF, 
F_WF; WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
7 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 7 answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 0 
answers of waterfowl in feed storage areas
2 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 2 answers of shorebirds in waterbodies; 0 
answer of shorebirds in feed storage areas
12 answers of other wild bird types in other locations (n); 4 answers of other bird types in 
waterbodies; 8 answers of other bird types in feed storage areas
Scott et al. (11, 13)
5. Aerial 
transmission 
of LPAI from 
wild birds 
to domestic 
chickens
Yes
No
Probability of LPAI introduction via aerial dispersion 
from wild birds on waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
12 samples tested at less than 100 m from 83 LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n), 0 positive 
air samples obtained
Jonges et al. (18)
6. Surface water 
is used for 
chickens
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that use surface water for the chicken 
farm (Surface_Water_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
9 farms surveyed (n), 3 farms used surface water for farm
Scott et al. (11, 13)
7. Locations 
surface water 
is used for
Inside shed
Outside shed
Proportion of answers from farmers that use surface 
water for inside the shed versus outside the shed (Water_
Inside_Used, Water_Outside_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
6 total answers of surface water use water is used for (n), 5 answers for inside the shed, 1 
answer for outside the shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
8. Water inside 
chicken 
sheds is 
treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water inside 
the chicken sheds (Water_Inside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
19 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 18 answers of water treated inside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
9. Water outside 
chicken 
sheds is 
treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water used 
outside the shed (Water_Outside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
1 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 1 answers of water treated outside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
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indoor farms, and this is in agreement with results presented here. 
However, during on-farm surveys, it was found that Australian 
free-range meat chickens are relatively restricted in their access to 
the outdoors, which is determined by their age and suitable out-
side weather conditions (11). Most Australian meat chickens are 
processed when they reach only 50 days, whereas layer chickens 
are kept in production until around 70–80 weeks (11, 25).
There have been a total of 15 confirmed LPAI cases in 
Australian poultry since 1976 (29, 30). These cases include LPAI 
detections of various subtypes, including outbreaks and single 
bird detections, in Australian poultry. These detections have been 
a result of passive surveillance (diagnostic submissions), active 
surveillance (during HPAI outbreaks) and incidental findings not 
associated with disease. Most have occurred in domestic flocks of 
ducks, with five incidents in combined chicken and duck farms. 
In addition, breeder birds were involved in several incidents, with 
two detections in breeder duck farms, two in breeder chicken 
farms, and two in mixed breeder and meat duck farms. Four 
cases occurred in meat poultry farms (two turkey and two duck 
farms). LPAI has never been detected on a meat chicken farm 
or on a single-species commercial egg layer enterprise (29). The 
exposure model considers single-species commercial chicken 
farms only. Therefore, of all LPAI detections that have occurred 
in Australia so far, comparisons with the model results can only 
be made with the two LPAI detections that occurred in breeder 
chicken farms. Breeder chicken farms are essentially equivalent 
to barn layer chicken farms and usually have good biosecurity 
(25). However, the exposure model suggests barn layers have the 
lowest probability of overall LPAI exposure compared to all farm 
types. As well as good biosecurity, breeder chicken farms tend 
to also have close flock health monitoring, as the LPAI detec-
tions that occurred were during outbreak investigation related 
to a drop in production performance (29). It is very likely LPAI 
detections in Australia are underreported as LPAI infections can 
be non-clinical, especially in ducks (29). This study found that 
information on AI virus characteristics and behavior, especially 
in an Australian context, is extremely scarce.
To best validate these models, routine sampling of Australian 
commercial chicken farms for LPAI should be conducted. 
According to the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan for AI 
(31), farms with positive detections of H5 or H7 AI virus via 
cloacal or oropharyngeal swabs must be depopulated and quar-
antine measures put into place. Given the current depopulation 
policy, the introduction of financial incentives or encouragement 
from industry is required to convince farmers to participate 
in active surveillance sampling. Voluntary participation in 
routine surveillance as part of a farm accreditation program 
can also be considered (32). As an alternative to this sampling 
approach, serological surveys can also be used as occurs in the 
Netherlands, where all poultry farms were tested for evidence 
of seroconversion at least once a year, with outdoor layer farms 
being tested three to four times per year. These data were used to 
estimate the introduction rates between different farm types (27). 
Serological sampling has also been performed in Australia but in 
small, sentinel free-range flocks located near waterfowl habitat 
and far from commercial chicken enterprises. Results from this 
sampling showed an extremely low introduction rate; from 2,000 Ta
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TaBle 5 | Nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of exposure of commercial chickens on free-range layer farms (specifically in the Sydney basin 
region and South East Queensland) in Australia to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) from wild birds.
node Branch of 
node
Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1. Type of wild bird on 
farm property
Waterfowl
Shorebirds
Other
Proportion of answers from farmers that reported 
the respective wild bird type on their property 
(Prop_WF; Prop_SH; Prop_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
140 answers of wild birds on the property (n); 44 answers of waterfowl; 33 answers of 
shorebirds; 63 answers of other wild birds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
2. Prevalence of LPAI in 
wild birds
Yes
No
Probability of the different wild bird types; 
waterfowl, shorebirds or other, being infected 
with LPAI of H5 or H7 subtype in winter, summer, 
and autumn/spring (Prev_WF_Winter; Prev_WF_
Summer; Prev_WF_AuSp; Prev_SH_Winter; Prev_
SH_Summer; Prev_SH_AuSp; Prev_O_Winter; 
Prev_O_Summer; Prev_O_AuSp)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1) multiplied by the proportion of H5 and H7 of total positive 
influenza A samples in New South Wales (NSW) for the seasons winter, summer, and 
autumn/spring
Information on the values for waterfowl and shorebirds that informed the Beta 
distributions for the 3 seasons and the proportion of influenza A samples that are H5 
and H7 subtypes can be obtained by contacting the corresponding author
1,552 other bird types samples (n), 1 positive other bird type sample (s); this Beta 
distribution used for all three seasons
Grillo et al. (1)
Hansbro et al. (17)
NSW NAIWB Surveillance 
unpublished data (2016)
3. Respective wild bird 
type has been reported 
inside chicken sheds
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that witnessed the respective 
wild bird type inside chicken sheds on the farm. 
The data suggests the probability for waterfowl and 
shorebirds inside sheds is close to 0 and, therefore, 
a Pert distribution is used for these wild bird types 
(Sheds_WF; Sheds_SH; Sheds_O)
Sheds_WF = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_SH = Pert (0, 0, 0.05)
Sheds_O = Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
25 farms surveyed; 13 reported seeing other wild bird types in sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
4. Respective wild bird 
type has been reported 
in other locations on 
the farm
Waterbodies
Feed storage
Proportion of answers from farmers that witnessed 
the respective wild bird type in the respective areas 
(WB_WF, F_WF; WB_SH, F_SH; WB_O, F_O)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
44 answers of waterfowl in other locations (n); 23 answers of waterfowl in waterbodies; 
9 answers of waterfowl in feed storage areas, 12 answers of waterfowl on the range
33 answers of shorebirds in other locations (n); 12 answers of shorebirds in 
waterbodies; 9 answer of shorebirds in feed storage areas, 12 answers of shorebirds 
on the range
50 answers of other wild bird types in other locations (n); 14 answers of other bird 
types in waterbodies; 16 answers of other bird types in feed storage areas, 20 answers 
of other bird types on the range
Scott et al. (11, 13)
5. Suitable weather 
conditions for range 
access
Yes
No
Probability that the weather conditions for seasons 
winter, summer, and autumn/spring are suitable 
for farmers to allow chickens on the range; when 
conditions are dry, between 17 and 28 C and  
there is no severe weather (Range_Winter,  
Range_Summer, Range_AuSp)
(Probability of suitable temperature + dry 
conditions + no severe weather)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Winter: 13,248 winter hours recorded (n), 1,555 winter hours > 17C; 1,755 winter 
hours where precipitation > 1mm; 114 severe weather events in NSW, 1 severe 
weather events in Sydney basin in winter
Summer: 13,248 summer hours recorded (n), 6,231.5 summer hours <28°C; 
8,098.5 summer hours where precipitation >1 mm; 114 severe weather events in 
NSW, 64 severe weather events in Sydney basin in summer
Autumn/Spring: 26,352 autumn/spring hours recorded (n), 9,338.5 autumn/spring 
hours >17°C and <28°C; 3,960.5 autumn/spring hours where precipitation >1 mm; 
114 severe weather events in NSW, 49 severe weather events in Sydney basin in 
autumn/spring
Bureau of  
Meterology (23)
6. Birds are a suitable 
age for range access
Yes
No
Proportion of the chicken’s lifetime in which they 
are allowed onto the range (Age)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Average age at flock depopulation 87.32 weeks (n), average age allowed outside 
22.94 weeks
Scott et al. (11, 13)
7. Birds actually go onto 
the range
Yes
No
Proportion of flock that actually leave shed and use 
the range as reported by farmers (Use_Range)
Average of 25 Beta functions (s + 1, n − s + 1)
Total flock proportion 100 (n); proportion of flock that use range (25 varying answers) 
Scott et al. (11, 13)
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node Branch of 
node
Parameter estimates input values Data sources
8. Aerial transmission of 
LPAI from wild birds 
to domestic chickens
Yes
No
Probability of LPAI introduction via aerial dispersion 
from wild birds on waterbodies to chickens on farm 
(Aerosol_WB)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
12 air samples tested at less than 100 m from 83 LPAI (H5N2) infected swans (n),  
0 positive air samples obtained
Jonges et al. (18)
9. Surface water is used 
for chickens
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that 
use surface water for the chicken farm 
(Surface_Water_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
25 farms surveyed (n), 6 answers used surface water for farm
Scott et al. (11, 13)
10. Locations surface 
water is used for
Inside shed
Outside shed
Proportion of answers from farmers that use 
surface water for inside the shed versus outside the 
shed (Water_Inside_Used, Water_Outside_Used)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
22 answers of surface water use (n), 12 answers use surface water inside shed,  
10 answers use surface water outside shed
Scott et al. (11, 13)
11. Water inside chicken 
sheds is treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water 
inside the chicken sheds (Water_Inside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
50 answers of water use inside chicken sheds (n), 48 answers of water treated inside 
chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
12. Water outside chicken 
sheds is treated
Yes
No
Proportion of answers from farmers that treat water 
used outside the shed (Water_Outside_Treated)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
17 answers of water use outside chicken sheds (n), 14 answers of water treated 
outside chicken sheds
Scott et al. (11, 13)
13. Chickens have 
escaped the shed or 
range area
Yes
No
Proportion of farms that have reported chickens 
unintentionally outside of the shed or range area 
(Escape)
Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)
25 farms surveyed (n), 21 farms reported chickens escaped shed or range area
Scott et al. (11, 13)
14. Other indirect routes 
that can lead to LPAI 
introduction
Yes
No
Probability that chickens will be exposed to 
LPAI virus via other indirect methods; boots, 
mice/rats, insects and pets combined into one 
probability (Indirect) (Probability of exposure from 
boots + mice/rats + insects + pets)
Probability of exposure from boots (PrBoots)
6/63 answers did not use footbaths
AI virus survival on boots is 3/6 days, considered high probability of exposure
PrBoots = (6/63) × [Uniform (0.7, 1)]
Probability of exposure from mice/rats (PrMice)
19/63 answers had mice/rats in sheds
12 mice inoculated (n), 0 positive on virus isolation
PrMice = (10/25) × [Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)]
Probability of exposure from insects (PrInsects)
25/63 answers had insects in sheds
171 insects tested (n), 73 positive on virus isolation
PrInsects = (25/63) × [Beta (s + 1, n − s + 1)]
Probability of exposure from pets (PrPets)
13/63 answers allowed pets in sheds on range area
AI virus survival on feces is 2/6 days, considered moderate probability of exposure
PrBoots = (13/63) × [Uniform (0.3, 0.5)]
Scott et al. (11, 13)
Henzler et al. (24)
Achenbach and Bowen 
(19)
Nielsen et al. (20)
Tiwari et al. (21)
Nazir et al. (22)
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FigUre 1 | Continued
FigUre 1 | Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on non-free-range layer farms to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from wild birds in 
Australia (Prop_WF, proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH, proportion of shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O, proportion of 
other bird types reported on property, Prev_WildBird_Season, prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in the respective 
season (winter, summer, or autumn/spring), Sheds_WildBird, proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) inside 
chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in feed storage areas, 
WB_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, Escape, 
proportion of farms that reported chickens escaping from shed, Indirect, probability of the occurrence of other indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, 
mice/rats, insects, farm cats, or dogs), Aerosol_WB, probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds on waterbodies, Surface_Water_
Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used for chicken farm, Water_Inside_Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used inside sheds, 
Water_Outside_Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used outside sheds, Water_Inside_Treated, proportion of answers that treat water used inside 
sheds, Water_Outside_Treated, proportion of answers that treat water used outside sheds).
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samples collected over 8 years, 0.85% (17) samples tested positive 
for AI antibodies and 4.35% (87) were uncertain. The number 
of H5 and H7 subtypes was not determined in the study (33). 
Although useful, this information cannot be confidently applied 
to commercial chicken enterprises due to stark differences in 
the number of birds in a flock, management practices, and farm 
locations.
Probability of Direct and indirect lPai 
exposure
The differences in the probability of direct and indirect exposure 
between free-range and non-free-range farms are likely due to 
the definitions of exposures types used in this model. Direct 
exposure is more likely to occur when chickens have access to 
the outdoors and, as such, exposure to the virus in non-free-
range farms is more likely to occur through indirect pathways. 
Biosecurity refers to actions to prevent the introduction and 
spread of infectious agents. In relation to poultry enterprises 
this refers to practices, such as the use of foot baths, treatment 
of water, disinfection of equipment between sheds, and vermin 
control (34). It was found during on-farm surveys that non-free-
range meat chicken farms were usually older farms with relatively 
poorer biosecurity compared to free-range meat chicken farms 
(12). This relative lack in biosecurity contributed to the highest 
median probability of indirect exposure occurring in non-free-
range meat chicken farms compared to the rest of the farm types. 
This in combination with the relative restriction to the outdoors 
in free-range meat chicken farms lead to the higher overall prob-
ability of LPAI exposure in non-free-range meat chicken farms 
compared to free-range meat chicken farms. Biosecurity was also 
relatively lacking in cage layer farms compared to other farm 
types, where layer chickens were reported to escape the sheds to 
the feed storage areas and wild birds reported to be inside sheds 
(11, 12). This explains the relatively high probability of both 
direct and indirect LPAI exposure in cage layer farms compared 
to other farm types.
Another major introduction route implicated for LPAI is the 
contamination of drinking water for chickens with infective 
wild bird feces. At least half of all Australian HPAI outbreaks 
so far are likely to have been associated with the introduction 
of LPAI via contaminated drinking water (4, 35). However, 
on-farm survey results showed a high level of water treatment 
across all farm types. The treatment methods identified in the 
on-farm surveys were deemed adequate to deactivate LPAI, 
due to the fragile nature and short persistence of AI viruses in 
the environment (21). Therefore, the use of surface water is not 
a highly influential parameter, also depicted in the sensitivity 
analyses, due to the high proportion of water treatment among 
all farm types. Overall, the treatment of water inside and outside 
sheds were not found to be significantly influential parameters. 
In general, it was found that water treatment inside sheds was 
more influential in the indoor, non-free-range farms compared 
to free-range farms due to the limited opportunities of direct 
exposure in indoor farm types.
The exposure sensitivity analysis revealed that the most 
influential parameters were related to waterfowl presence on 
the farm; particularly the proportion of waterfowl among wild 
birds on the property, waterfowl around feed storage areas, and 
waterfowl on the range. Waterfowl on waterbodies was not a 
highly influential parameter due to the high proportion of farms 
that treat surface water, as previously mentioned, and the low 
probability of aerosol transmission of LPAI from wild waterfowl 
on waterbodies to commercial chickens (18). However, water-
bodies are an attractant for waterfowl and artificial waters, such 
as dams are used extensively by waterfowl (36) and it is expected 
that waterfowl on waterbodies in proximity to farms will move to 
feed storage areas or the range of the farm. To effectively reduce 
the probability of LPAI exposure to Australian commercial 
chickens, efforts must be considered to ethically and effectively 
deter waterfowl from chicken farms. However, farm dams play 
an important role in water supply and irrigation in Australian 
agriculture and so the removal of open water sources can be 
of a great detriment to the farmer (37). In addition, covering 
open water sources and netting ranges are cost prohibitive (38). 
Recommendations from a critical review on the deterrence of 
wild waterfowl from Australian poultry production areas include 
maintaining optimal grass height, preventing grass going to 
seed, improving drainage on range areas and around sheds, and 
prompt cleaning of feed spills around feed storage areas. Other 
sophisticated recommendations include the development of a 
24/7 waterfowl monitoring system on farm and then trialing 
a range of cost-effective radar-activated on-demand auditory, 
visual, or physical deterrent systems (38).
Volume of Wild Birds on the Probability  
of lPai exposure
In addition to the presence of waterfowl in different areas of 
the farm, the actual number of waterfowl present as well as 
the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl are highly influential on 
the potential number of exposures occurring. The 1994 H7N2 
FigUre 2 | Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on non-free-range meat chicken farms to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from wild 
birds in Australia (Prop_WF, proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH, proportion of shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O, 
proportion of other bird types reported on property, Prev_WildBird_Season, prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in the 
respective season (winter, summer, or autumn/spring), Sheds_WildBird, proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or 
other) inside chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in feed 
storage areas, WB_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, 
Escape, proportion of farms that reported chickens escaping from shed, Indirect, probability of the occurrence of other indirect methods that can introduce LPAI 
(boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats, or dogs), Aerosol_WB, probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds on waterbodies, Surface_
Water_Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used for chicken farm, Water_Inside_Treated, proportion of answers that treat water used inside sheds).
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FigUre 3 | Continued
outbreak in Lowood, Queensland is a classic example of both 
Australian waterfowl movements and the impact of the number 
of waterfowl in a property. The outbreak occurred during severe 
drought and a river that constituted one border for the farm as 
well as a small dam near the entrance of the chicken sheds had 
attracted a large population of wild birds prior to the subsequent 
outbreak. LPAI was speculated to be introduced to the flock 
through contaminated drinking water (4). Currently, there is no 
available data that accurately estimates the number of wild birds 
that visit Australian commercial chicken farms over a certain 
TaBle 6 | Median (5 and 95 percentiles) probabilities of direct and indirect exposure of a chicken on the commercial chicken farm types (non-free-range meat chicken, 
free-range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free-range layer) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses for the first time at any point in time from wild birds in 
Australia (specifically in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland).
exposure and farm type Median 5% 95% Fstatistic (degrees of freedom); p-value
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect)
Non-free-range meat chicken 0.00037 0.00020 0.00064 F(4,4995) = 1812.63; <0.0001
Free-range meat chicken 0.00032 0.00018 0.00057
Cage layer 0.00032 0.00015 0.00063
Barn layer 0.00030 0.00014 0.00058
Free-range layer 0.00075 0.00057 0.00010
Probability of direct exposure
Non-free-range meat chicken 8.68 × 10−5 3.153 × 10−5 0.00019 F(4,4995) = 8927.21; <0.0001
Free-range meat chicken 0.00016 8.45 × 10−5 0.00030
Cage layer 0.00011 3.81 × 10−5 0.00025
Barn layer 8.82 × 10−5 3.00 × 10−5 0.00022
Free-range layer 0.00056 0.00043 0.00073
Probability of indirect exposure
Non-free-range meat chicken 0.00027 0.00014 0.00053 F(4,4995) = 235.78; <0.0001
Free-range meat chicken 0.00016 5.72 × 10−5 0.00036
Cage layer 0.00020 7.76 × 10−5 0.00047
Barn layer 0.00019 7.46 × 10−5 0.00045
Free-range layer 0.00017 9.38 × 10−5 0.00036
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect—5 sheds on the property)
Non-free-range meat chicken 0.00185 0.001 0.0032 F(4,4995) = 1878.45; <0.0001
Free-range meat chicken 0.0016 0.0009 0.00285
Cage layer 0.0016 0.00075 0.00315
Barn layer 0.0015 0.0007 0.0029
Free-range layer 0.00375 0.00285 0.0005
Overall probability of exposure (direct and indirect—10 sheds on the property)
Non-free-range meat chicken 0.0037 0.002 0.0064 F(4,4995) = 1878.45; <0.0001
Free-range meat chicken 0.0032 0.0018 0.0057
Cage layer 0.0032 0.0015 0.0063
Barn layer 0.003 0.0014 0.0058
Free-range layer 0.0075 0.0057 0.001
FigUre 3 | Scenario tree representing the exposure of chickens on free-range layer and meat chicken farms to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from 
wild birds in Australia (Prop_WF, proportion of waterfowl answers reported on property, Prop_SH, proportion of shorebird answers reported on property, Prop_O, 
proportion of other bird types reported on property, Prev_WildBird_Season, prevalence of LPAI of the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in the 
respective season (winter, summer, or autumn/spring), Sheds_WildBird, proportion of farms that reported the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or 
other) inside chicken sheds on the farm, F_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in feed 
storage areas, WB_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) in waterbodies on/near the farm, 
R_WildBird, proportion of answers that witnessed the respective wild bird type (waterfowl, shorebird, or other) on the range, Escape, proportion of farms that 
reported chickens escaping from shed and from range, Indirect, probability of the occurrence of other indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, 
insects, farm cats, or dogs), Aerosol_WB, probability of LPAI exposure from aerial dispersion of virus from wild birds on waterbodies, Surface_Water_Used, 
proportion of answers that surface water is used for chicken farm, Water_Inside_Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used inside sheds, Water_
Outside_Used, proportion of answers that surface water is used outside sheds, Water_Inside_Treated, proportion of answers that treat water used inside sheds, 
Water_Outside_Treated, proportion of answers that treat water used outside sheds, Range_Season, probability that weather conditions are suitable for chickens to 
access range, Age, proportion of chicken’s lifetime in which they are allowed onto range, Use_range, proportion of flock that actually leave shed and use range).
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time period. Wildlife camera trapping work conducted by Scott 
et al. (13) demonstrated an average of 17 wild bird sightings a 
week. This is very likely an underestimate as the cameras did 
not capture the whole farm area. However, this data can be 
extrapolated, and it can be said that approximately 17 wild birds 
a week is equivalent to approximately 1,000 wild birds a year. 
Therefore, the number of exposures estimated in this study for 
1,000 wild birds present at one point in time could indicate the 
cumulative expected number of exposures that can occur in one 
year. Accurate information of wild bird numbers can be obtained 
from manual wild bird farm surveys or the development of a 24/7 
wild bird monitoring system on farm as was stated as a recom-
mendation for wild waterfowl deterrence previously (38).
The effects of season on the Probability  
of lPai exposure
The probability of the first exposure to LPAI virus for a chicken 
on an Australian commercial chicken farm was found to be 
lowest in summer for all farm types. The highest probability 
was estimated to be in winter for chickens on free-range layer 
TaBle 7 | Number of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus exposures that would occur given a number of wild birds (n) and changes in the overall probability of LPAI exposure (p) with changes in the proportion 
of wild birds on the farm that are waterfowl and the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl for the commercial chicken farm types (non-free-range meat chicken, free-range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free-range 
layer) at any point in time out of 100 scenarios (or farms) using binomial distributions.
Waterfowl proportion standard 100% 80% 100% 50% 50%
Waterfowl lPai prevalence standard standard 20% 10% 20% 10%
Farm type number of wild birds Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95%
Non-free-range meat chicken 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1,000 0 0 2 1 0 3 3 0 7 2 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3
Free-range meat chicken 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1,000 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3
Cage layer 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1,000 0 0 2 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 2 0 5 1 0 3
Barn layer 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1,000 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 3
Free-range layer 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
100 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1
1,000 1 0 2 2 0 5 6 2 11 4 1 8 4 1 8 2 0 5
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TaBle 8 | Median (5 and 95 percentiles) overall probabilities of exposure  
(direct and indirect) of a chicken on the commercial chicken farm types  
(non-free-range meat chicken, free-range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, 
free-range layer) to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses for the first time 
at any point in time during the three defined seasons; winter (June–August); 
summer (December–February); and autumn and spring (March–May and 
September–November); from wild birds in Australia (specifically in the Sydney 
basin bioregion and South East Queensland).
Farm type Median 5% 95% Fstatistic (degrees  
of freedom);
p-value
Winter
Non-free-range 
meat chicken
0.00044 0.00024 0.00079 F(4,4995) = 2327.39; 
<0.0001
Free-range meat 
chicken
0.00039 0.00022 0.00068
Cage layer 0.00038 0.00017 0.00077
Barn layer 0.00035 0.00016 0.00070
Free-range layer 0.00102 0.00076 0.0014
summer
Non-free-range 
meat chicken
0.00019 0.00010 0.00034 F(4,4995) = 403.78; 
<0.0001
Free-range meat 
chicken
0.00018 9.06 × 10−5 0.00035
Cage layer 0.00018 8.09 × 10−5 0.00036
Barn layer 0.00017 7.56 × 10−5 0.00033
Free-range layer 0.00030 0.00020 0.00049
autumn/spring
Non-free-range 
meat chicken
0.00046 0.00026 0.00082 F(4,4995) = 1525.98; 
<0.0001
Free-range meat 
chicken
0.00039 0.00023 0.00069
Cage layer 0.00040 0.00018 0.00079
Barn layer 0.00036 0.00017 0.00072
Free-range layer 0.00093 0.00069 0.0012
FigUre 4 | Number of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus exposures that would occur given a number of wild birds (n) and changes in the overall probability 
of LPAI exposure (p) with changes in the proportion of wild birds on the farm that are waterfowl and the prevalence of LPAI in waterfowl for the commercial poultry 
farm types (non-free-range meat chicken, free-range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, free-range layer) at any point in time out of 100 scenarios (or farms) using 
binomial distributions; WF, waterfowl.
21
Scott et al. Avian Influenza Exposure Risk Assessment
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 68
farms and autumn/spring for the rest of the farms, except for 
free-range meat chicken farms which reported no difference 
between winter and autumn/spring. However, there were minor 
differences in the probabilities of exposure for all farm types 
between winter and autumn/spring overall. Among previous 
HPAI outbreaks in Australia, one occurred in winter (July), four 
in autumn and spring (May, October, and November), and two 
in summer (December and January). The three latest outbreaks 
that occurred in Tamworth (1997), Maitland (2012), and Young 
(2013) occurred in October or November (4, 39, 40). The mecha-
nisms of mutation from LPAI to HPAI are poorly understood 
and difficult to predict. In some overseas outbreaks, LPAI viruses 
have been detected in domestic poultry weeks or months prior to 
the subsequent HPAI virus outbreaks (41). It could be speculated 
for the Australian HPAI outbreaks that occurred in summer, 
when the probability of LPAI exposure is estimated to be lowest 
compared to the other seasons, which introduction of the virus 
occurred during spring, the virus then circulated within the flock 
for months and mutation subsequently occurring in summer 
(42). On the other hand, Fusaro et  al. (43) demonstrated that 
some H7 LPAI subtypes detected in Italy can mutate quickly in 
order to adapt to the new host species.
The seasonal variations in the probability of exposure are 
influenced by the wild bird LPAI prevalence data and the 
guidelines on outside weather conditions that determine 
whether or not chickens are provided access to the range. The 
overall prevalence of LPAI in Australian wild waterfowl at any 
point in time is approximately 2.5%. Seasonal effects on the 
prevalence of LPAI in wild birds within NSW do not appear to 
fluctuate as greatly as in the northern hemisphere (17). There 
is evidence to suggest that the fluctuation of wild bird LPAI 
prevalence in Australia is more dependent on rainfall patterns 
and bird movements, abundance and breeding particularly in 
Australian waterfowl (44, 45). In the northern hemisphere, 
there is generally a low prevalence of LPAI in winter, an 
increase in viral prevalence in summer, followed by a peak 
in prevalence in autumn (46, 47). This contrasts with NSW 
data which reveals a high prevalence of LPAI in winter and 
autumn/spring and a low prevalence in summer (17). In the 
northern hemisphere, the increased prevalence in summer is 
thought to be due to the progressive influx of immunonaïve 
juvenile waterfowl to the population, following breeding in 
spring (48). In Australia, the breeding seasons and movements 
FigUre 5 | Results of the sensitivity analysis on the exposure assessment depicting the change in probability (Y-axis) on the median overall probability of exposure 
(horizontal line) of a chicken on a commercial chicken farm to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus from wild birds in Australia with changes of certain input 
variables listed in Tables 4 and 5 (X-axis). Results were obtained from a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. [(a) = non-free-
range meat chicken; (B) = free-range meat chicken; (c) = cage layer; (D) = barn layer; (e) = free-range layer]; Prop_WF, proportion of waterfowl reported on 
property, WB_WF, proportion of responses that witnessed waterfowl in waterbodies on/near the farm, F_WF, proportion of responses that witnessed waterfowl in 
feed storage areas, R_WF, proportion of responses that witnessed waterfowl on the range, Surface_Water_Used, proportion of responses that use surface water for 
the chicken farm, Water_Inside_Treated, proportion of responses that treat water used inside sheds, Water_Outside_Treated, proportion of responses that treat 
water used outside sheds, Escape, proportion of farms that reported chickens escaping from shed [and from range for (B) and (e)], Indirect, probability of the 
occurrence of other indirect methods that can introduce LPAI (boots, mice/rats, insects, farm cats, or dogs).
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of waterfowl are less predictable; many populations are 
nomadic, which contrasts with the waterfowl populations 
in the northern hemisphere which are well known for their 
annual migrations over long distances. Movements and breed-
ing of Australian waterfowl are instead largely determined by 
the distribution of surface water and rainfall (49, 50). A high 
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prevalence of LPAI may occur during periods of waterfowl 
congregation, such as during droughts. A particular example 
that supports this point is the 1994 H7N3 HPAI outbreak that 
occurred in Queensland, Australia, which took place during a 
period of severe drought. Water used for the farm was drawn 
from a river on the periphery of the farm and had attracted 
a large population of wild birds. This likely greatly increased 
the probability of LPAI exposure to the farm and lead to the 
HPAI outbreak (4).
Birds in the families Scolopacidae and Charadriidae (shore-
birds and waders) do undergo annual migrations over long 
distances and visit Australasia (49). In the northern hemisphere, 
the arrival of migrant birds to the resident population coincides 
with the peak LPAI prevalence in autumn. Migrating birds may 
be more susceptible to infection from long distance flights and/
or relatively low immune resistance to locally circulating LPAI 
strains compared to resident birds (48). These shorebirds are 
more likely to become infected with local Australian LPAI sub-
types rather than bring exotic strains of the virus into Australia; 
the probability of the latter occurring was previously estimated to 
be extremely low (51).
conclusion
There are still many uncertainties related to the mechanisms 
of the LPAI virus introduction and exposure, particularly in 
Australian commercial chicken farm settings. However, the 
results of this study have used the best data available at this 
time. The results suggest that chickens on commercial free-
range layer farms have approximately double the risk of LPAI 
exposure compared to other farm types. The probability of 
direct exposure is also more likely in both free-range layer 
and meat chicken farms compared to the other farm types. 
Moreover, the probability of LPAI exposure seems to be lower 
in summer compared to all other seasons and this is influenced 
by the prevalence of LPAI in wild birds and the weather 
conditions in which free-range chickens are allowed to go on 
the range. The proportion of waterfowl on the farm and the 
presence of waterfowl on the range and feed storage areas are 
the most influential parameters on the probability of exposure. 
These results highlight the importance of good biosecurity on 
farms, providing insight regarding the on-farm actions that 
can reduce the risk of LPAI exposure such as those related to 
waterfowl deterrence. In addition, the importance of continu-
ous surveillance of Australian wild bird populations to monitor 
LPAI prevalence and subtypes is highlighted, as this can help 
predict future introductions and outbreaks. The need of further 
research in AI virus properties, particularly in an Australian 
context is also highlighted.
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